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PRESCRIBING THE PILL IN JAPAN?
FOREWORD TO THE HOSTILE M&A
CONFERENCE ISSUE
Curtis J. Milhaupt*
Contrary to popular belief, corporate Japan is changingincrementally, to be sure, but changing nonetheless. One of
the areas of greatest potential change is the legal and
business environment for mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"),
including hostile M&A. Recent amendments to Japan's
Commercial Code in the areas of stock swaps and
divestitures are helping to facilitate M&A transactions.1 At
the same time, the constellation of shareholders in Japanese
firms is changing as cross-shareholding declines and foreign
investment increases. M&A activity in Japan has increased
significantly in recent years.2

* Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law and Legal Institutions, Columbia
Law School. I want to express my gratitude to the law firm Mori Hamada
& Matsumoto for generously funding the conference, and particularly to
the Columbia Law School alumni of the firm for their invaluable logistical
support. Tony Zaloom, Of Counsel to Mori Hamada & Matsumoto,
deserves special mention for conceiving the project and nudging it along at
critical stages.
1 For more detail on recent amendments to the Commercial Code and
their impact on Japanese corporate governance, see CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, A
LOST DECADE FOR JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM? WHAT'S
CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T, AND WHY (Columbia Law School Ctr. for Law and
Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 234, 2003).
2 For example, in 1997, Japan had just 0.6% of world M&A
transactions (measured by transaction value)-less, for example, than
Bermuda and Malaysia. By the first quarter of 2002, Japan's share had
increased to 5.5% of the world total. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West,
Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity through Deals, in
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While virtually all of the recent deals have been friendly,
there have been several prominent examples of unsolicited
bids, by both foreign and Japanese bidders. In the space of a
few years, hostile takeovers of Japanese firms have gone
from the unthinkable to the distinctly possible. It is possible
that over the next few years, such transactions will become a
small but meaningful feature of the Japanese corporate
governance landscape. Perhaps not coincidentally, a recent
Commercial Code amendment made a commonly used
defensive measure in the U.S.-the shareholder rights plan
(better known as the "poison pill")-technically feasible for
Japanese firms. The amendment permits the issuance by
the board of directors-in most cases without shareholder
approval-of an option-like financial instrument called a
stock acquisition right (shin kabu yoyaku ken).3 Although
still a matter of debate among Japanese scholars and
practitioners (see especially the article by Satoshi Kawai in
this issue), with proper planning, it appears that the share
acquisition right could be used to replicate essential features
of the U.S. poison pill defense.
On June 13, 2003, Columbia Law School's Center for
Japanese Legal Studies, with financial support from a major
Japanese law firm, hosted a symposium in Tokyo entitled
"Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: Prospects and
Policy." The symposium was designed to achieve a deeper
understanding
of the current legal and business
environments for hostile M&A and defensive measures in
Japan, and to glean possible lessons from the U.S.
experience with hostile takeovers. The papers that follow,
authored by an extraordinary cast of Japanese and U.S.
experts, are the offspring of the conference. As the director
of the Center for Japanese Legal Studies, I am delighted that
these insights are being widely disseminated to readers of
the Columbia Business Law Review.
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At least at a conceptual level, many of the recent
amendments to the Japanese Commercial Code-including,
but not limited to, those relating to M&A-reflect a greater
concern for shareholder welfare (traditionally a focus of U.S.
managers), and permit large Japanese firms to adopt
governance
structures-such
as independent
audit
committees and formal separation of executive and nonexecutive directors-similar to those used in the United
States. The U.S. experience with hostile takeover defenses is
thus relevant not only for what it might suggest for Japan on
the narrow topic of hostile acquisitions, but for the
development of Japanese corporate law and governance more
generally. As Chancellor Chandler's article in this issue
illustrates, many of the important developments in Delaware
corporate law relating to the duties of directors and the
balance of power between shareholders and directors have
emerged out of judicial decisions in the takeover context. To
take one important example outside the scope of Chancellor
Chandler's analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions
in the cash out merger context have created significant
incentives for boards to have independent committees,
assisted by independent and sophisticated legal and
financial advisors, to structure and negotiate transactions
that pose significant risks to minority shareholders. In this
way, M&A activity in the United States has served as an
important catalyst for legal and structural evolution in
corporate governance. Perhaps the same will be true of
Japan.
Indeed, the prospect of hostile M&A and the installation
of defensive mechanisms in Japan raise a host of important
legal issues, including most fundamentally the proper roles
of directors, shareholders and the courts in responding to
contests for corporate control. Although Japanese courts
have confronted this key question in isolated past instances,
they did so at a very different stage in Japan's economic
development-a time when prevailing standards of
appropriate managerial behavior vis-&-vis shareholders were
4 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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quite different than they are today. Moreover, the standard
of judicial review emerging from these cases is not
particularly relevant to a pill-like defense. 5 More broadly,
hostile M&A and defensive measures have implications for
Japan's entire system of corporate governance, including its
traditional focus on the protection of employees and the
relatively weak position of the capital markets in monitoring
firms, as least in relation to the "main bank" system.
Before turning to the articles in this issue, two conference
presentations that are not published here deserve mention.
At the conference, Nobumichi Hattori, until recently a
managing director of Goldman Sachs (Japan) Ltd. and the
author of a well-known book on Japanese mergers and
aquisitions, provided data showing that hostile M&A activity
around the world generally increases following financial
crises, and is fuelled by poorly performing stock markets in
which an acquirer's shares might command a favorable
exchange ratio in relation to those of a target. Hattori
argued that since these conditions appear to prevail in Japan
today, there is significant potential for hostile deals to
emerge.
The second speaker at the conference, Yoshiaki
Murakami, President of M&A Consulting, Inc., is a wellknown shareholder activist who has launched proxy fights
and bids for Japanese firms whose managers appear to be
hoarding cash or otherwise underutilizing assets. Murakami
is something of a pioneer in the wilds of traditional
Japanese-style management, although he has yet to discover
a path to victory. In his remarks, Murakami emphasized
that poison pills and other takeover defenses should be

' See, e.g., Shfawa K.K. v. K.K. Chjitsuya, 1317 HANREI JIHO 28
(1989), translatedin JAPANESE LAW IN CONTEXT: READINGS IN SOCIETY, THE
ECONOMY, AND POLITICS 502 (Curtis J. Milhaupt et al. eds., 2001)
(invalidating a board's issuance of shares to a white knight in the face of a
hostile bid where the "primary purpose" of the allotment was to dilute the
bidder's stake, not to raise funds for the corporation).
6 Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of
Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
2083, 2212-14 (2001).
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evaluated, not in light of how well they buffer management
from erstwhile hostile acquirers, but by the extent to which
they benefit shareholders. He posited that any defensive
measure should be judged against three tests: (1) Does it
increase shareholder value?; (2) Does it improve corporate
governance?; and (3) Is it fair to shareholders? He expressed
skepticism, given cross-shareholding arrangements and the
dominance of boards by insiders, that the poison pill is
needed in the Japanese context. The likely prospect, he
argued, was that the pill would be used simply to entrench
management.
Turning to the articles in this volume, Satoshi Kawai, a
partner of Mori Hamada & Matsumoto, analyzes issues
presented by poison pills under Japanese law. The two
primary legal obstacles to implementation of the pill in
Japan are (1) that stock acquisition rights are formally
separate from shares of stock, so it is difficult to ensure that
the two financial instruments are automatically distributed
together under a rights plan, and (2) discrimination against
the hostile bidder that is central to the operation of a poison
pill may conflict with the deeply engrained principle of equal
treatment of shareholders (kabunushi by~d6 gensoku) under
Japanese corporate law. Kawai suggests several forms that
the poison pill may take in Japan to overcome these
obstacles. Each of the structures he suggests has potential
advantages and disadvantages, but the analysis remains
hypothetical because none has yet been tested in the courts.
In the next article, Professor Ronald Gilson of Columbia
Law School provides important institutional context in which
to evaluate the phenomenon of hostile takeovers. He notes
that previously negative
attitudes
toward
hostile
acquisitions in Europe (similar to those currently prevailing
in Japan) have softened as the role of such transactions in
corporate restructuring has become more widely appreciated.
Theoretically, Professor Gilson argues, hostile M&A can be
viewed as an "equilibrating device" that moves corporate
assets to more productive uses following technological or
macro-economic changes. Given the massive misallocation of
resources in economically bedraggled Japan, Professor
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Gilson provides a theoretical lens through which to view
hostile M&A as one of the fixes for the country's problems.
Professor Gilson emphasizes that poison pills in the United
States are not used simply to block hostile bids, since
independent directors, courts, and institutional investors all
play a role in policing misuse of defensive tactics. He
suggests that in Japan, this policing role will fall largely to
the courts, as the other institutions remain underdeveloped.
William Chandler III, Chancellor of the Delaware
Chancery Court, discusses the role of the Delaware courts in
the U.S. system of corporate governance, using the decisions
of the Chancery Court surrounding the evolution of the
poison pill as an example. He notes that when hostile
acquisitions began in the U.S. in the late 1970s and early
1980s during a restructuring wave, they were soon followed
by the creation of the poison pill as a defensive measure.
These developments posed a fundamental question not
answered by existing legislation: Who would review the use
of this new device? Chancellor Chandler shows that with
little legislative guidance on vital issues such as the balance
of power between shareholders and directors in responding
to contests for corporate control, the Delaware courts
gradually developed a workable common law of corporations
in incremental steps, preserving flexibility and the
opportunity for re-evaluation.
He suggests that the
Japanese judiciary may now face a similar challenge.
In the final article, Hideki Kanda of the University of
Tokyo Faculty of Law, one of Japan's leading corporate law
scholars, responds to Professor Gilson and Chancellor
Chandler, while offering his own perspective on the
Japanese situation. He points out that empirical evidence on
the benefits of both hostile M&A and defensive tactics is
ambiguous.
This empirical ambiguity makes hostile
takeovers one of the most difficult issues in corporate law
and policy. To illustrate, he points out the wide range of
responses to hostile deals under national laws, from
unfettered shareholder authority in the U.K. to board veto
power in the Netherlands. Kanda agrees that hostile M&A
in Japan may increase in the future, and that defenses
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against unsolicited bids may become widespread. If this
occurs, Kanda agrees with other authors that Japanese
courts will be forced to address difficult questions about the
balance of power between directors and shareholders without
any clear guidance from the Commercial Code.
This
doctrinal vacuum, in Kanda's view, may cause the Japanese
Diet (legislature) to develop bright-line rules on these
questions.
So the consensus among conference participants is that
current conditions in Japan may well lead to an increase in
hostile M&A activity, and in turn, to the widespread
adoption of takeover defenses such as the poison pill.
Although Japanese experts are giving serious consideration
to the U.S. experience as an important reference point, the
articles in this issue suggest the danger of merely copying
the technical features of the U.S. poison pill without
considering the different institutional contexts in which
defensive measures operate in the U.S. and Japan. The
Japanese now face the dual challenge of devising hostile
takeover defenses that are appropriate to Japanese legal and
market conditions, while fostering institutions, such as the
courts, to ensure that the poison pill operates to protect and
enhance shareholder welfare rather than to entrench
management.
Before figuratively turning the podium over to the
authors of the articles that follow, I want to mention several
important issues (from my perspective, anyway), which are
not reflected in the conference proceedings.
First, the
discussion in the articles understandably focuses on the role
of the judiciary in policing implementation of the pill.
Japanese courts, like their U.S. counterparts, will almost
certainly play a key role in reviewing the pill's use in clashes
between corporate incumbents and insurgents. Yet an
exclusive focus on the courts misses two important
institutions that are likely to be significant in policing both
hostile takeovers and the use of the pill: the bureaucracy and
the capital market. At least some market players seem to
fear negative reactions from regulatory authorities,
particularly the Ministry of Finance ("MOF"), for launching
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hostile acquisitions.
One high-level manager of a U.S.
investment bank in Tokyo colorfully suggested to me after
the conference that "if we financed a hostile deal here, the
next day we would be called in to have our knee caps broken
by MOF." While an anecdote hardly proves that regulators
are discouraging unsolicited bids for Japanese firms, we
should not completely overlook regulators as we survey the
institutional landscape for hostile M&A in Japan.
Potential for regulatory backlash aside, the capital
market itself still seems reluctant to breach the line between
friendly and hostile bids, for reasons that apparently have
little to do with economics. For example, it is common
knowledge that a significant number of firms are trading on
the Tokyo Stock Exchange at prices below their net asset
values. Despite the obvious potential to profit by acquiring
control of these firms, almost no attempts have been made.
Why? Either transaction costs are too high or stigma about
such deals persists.7 And what of the first Japanese firm to
adopt a pill?
Do Japanese managers sufficiently fear
backlash from their existing shareholders, the capital
markets or the financial press to refrain from employing the
share acquisition right as a defensive measure? Or does the
impact of the norm cut the other way, so that managers who
deploy the pill will be applauded for staving off socially
harmful activity at a time of economic vulnerability for
Japan? We don't know the answer, but the question, I
believe, is interesting and important.
The foregoing points reinforce the two major themes
emerging from the conference: First, the pill will developand must be understood-in the Japanese context. It cannot
be copied, judicial standards of review and all, from the
United States. Second, it would be unfortunate for Japan if
the pill simply served as a replacement or booster shot for
7 See Milhaupt & West, supra note 2. Probably it is a combination of
the two. In numerous discussions over the past several years, Japanese
and non-Japanese investment bankers have told me they fear that
involvement in a hostile deal (at least the first one!) would damage their
reputations in the Japanese market. All of them, however, seem quite
eager to be involved in the second hostile deal.
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the historically potent but gradually declining nonlegal
barriers to a market for corporate control in Japan, such as
cross shareholding practices.
Japanese corporate law and governance are indeed
changing. Events may be pressing all constituencies to
rethink some fundamental questions about their roles in the
Japanese firm. I hope this conference issue contributes to
that process of change and re-evaluation.

